External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar met Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi on the sidelines of diplomatic engagements in May 2026, with both ministers agreeing to accelerate bilateral coordination on energy supply chain resilience and maritime connectivity, according to India’s Ministry of External Affairs. The meeting produced a commitment to convene a joint working group within 60 days covering critical minerals, LNG supply security, and green hydrogen technology transfer.
Why the timing is significant
Both nations share near-identical structural vulnerabilities in energy. India imports roughly 87% of its crude oil requirements, according to data from the Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell (PPAC), Ministry of Petroleum. Japan’s Agency for Natural Resources and Energy puts its primary energy import dependence at around 88–90%, a figure that has held since the post-Fukushima nuclear shutdowns of 2011. That’s two of Asia’s four largest economies almost entirely exposed to the same chokepoints: the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca, and increasingly, the Red Sea corridor.
India’s total crude and petroleum product import bill for FY2023-24 was $132.4 billion, per PPAC data. Japan’s LNG import costs have fluctuated sharply since 2022; Japan Customs data for 2023 showed total LNG import value at approximately ¥8.8 trillion ($58 billion), up from pre-2022 baseline levels. Neither government can absorb extended supply disruptions without visible macroeconomic damage.
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The semiconductor angle nobody foregrounded
What stood out about the readout from this meeting: semiconductors were not listed on the formal agenda. That’s notable because Japan’s Economic Security Promotion Act, enacted May 2022 and covering semiconductors, rare earths, cloud infrastructure, and critical medicines, is the closest legislative parallel to what India is building through its Critical Minerals Mission and PLI (Production Linked Incentive) scheme. The two frameworks are structurally compatible. Working-level officials from both governments have, per MEA background briefings, held separate semiconductor supply chain conversations outside the formal bilateral calendar. Expect chips to appear explicitly in the 60-day working group output.
Green hydrogen: the underreported deal thread
The SIGHT scheme, Strategic Interventions for Green Hydrogen Transition, is India’s central policy vehicle for electrolyser manufacturing and fuel cell deployment. Japan has been pursuing green hydrogen import corridors since its 2020 Green Growth Strategy. The two countries have a direct technology-transfer opportunity here: Japanese electrolyser and fuel cell manufacturers need large-scale deployment markets; India needs the technology. This bilateral channel is less covered than the LNG discussions but may carry more long-term industrial value.
JERA, Japan’s largest power generator by capacity, has publicly stated interest in LNG supply partnerships with South Asian counterparts. Separately, Panasonic and TDK have both disclosed India manufacturing evaluations in their investor communications through 2024-25.
ODA and the financial architecture underneath
Japan remains India’s single largest bilateral development finance partner. According to Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) data, cumulative ODA loan commitments to India have exceeded ¥4.9 trillion (approximately $32–33 billion at current exchange rates), deployed across metro rail, clean energy, and industrial corridor projects. New project approvals in semiconductor training infrastructure and green energy are under active JICA appraisal.
That financial relationship is the backbone of the bilateral. The ministerial meetings set direction; the ODA pipeline is where project-level commitments actually move.
Maritime connectivity: ports and redundancy
India’s Sagarmala program and Japan’s maritime ODA commitments across the Indian Ocean rim have natural convergence points, specifically around port infrastructure that creates redundant logistics routes if a primary chokepoint becomes constrained. Both countries participate in IPEF (Indo-Pacific Economic Framework) and the Quad, where civilian maritime infrastructure has become a standard agenda item alongside defence coordination. The India-Japan 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministers’ format, last held in 2024, explicitly included maritime domain awareness and undersea cable resilience.
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FAQ
Q: How much does India depend on energy imports?
India imports approximately 87% of its crude oil needs (PPAC, Ministry of Petroleum). Total petroleum imports in FY2023-24 were $132.4 billion.
Q: What is Japan’s Economic Security Promotion Act?
Enacted in May 2022, it designates semiconductors, rare earths, cloud infrastructure, and critical medicines as strategic sectors requiring supply chain oversight and domestic stockpiling mandates.
Q: What is the SIGHT scheme India discussed with Japan?
SIGHT, Strategic Interventions for Green Hydrogen Transition, is India’s incentive programme for electrolyser manufacturing and green hydrogen offtake. It runs alongside the National Green Hydrogen Mission, targeting 5 million metric tonnes of annual production by 2030.
The 60-day working group deadline is the next concrete trigger to watch. If semiconductor cooperation appears on its formal output, it marks a significant expansion of what started as an energy supply discussion.
